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Summary
We estimate that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) as enacted would reduce the number of uninsured 
by nearly half, from 50 million nonelderly people to 26 
million. The federal legal requirement for most Americans 
to be covered by a health insurance plan that meets certain 
minimal standards or face a penalty—the so-called individual 
mandate—is an important part of achieving this reduction. 
Under health reform without a mandate, between 40 and 42 
million would remain uninsured.
Tens of billions of dollars are spent each year by all levels of 
government and health care providers on uncompensated 
care for the uninsured. By reducing the number of uninsured, 
the ACA would reduce the amount spent on uncompensated 
care by about half. Without an individual mandate, the 
reduction in uncompensated care spending would be much 
lower due to the increased number of uninsured.
The ACA would increase private insurance coverage by 
about 7 million people. If the mandate were eliminated from 
the law as enacted, private coverage would fall by about 11 
million, covering about 4 million fewer people than it would 
have without reform. The government would spend less 
on subsidized coverage in the exchanges due to decreased 
enrollment, even though the amount spent per person on 
subsidies would increase. With a mandate, the Medicaid 
expansion would increase enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP 
by 16 million. There would be 2 million fewer enrollees 
without a mandate.
The effects on nongroup insurance premiums of eliminating 
the individual mandate are very sensitive to the number and 
costs of people who would enroll in subsidized coverage in 
the health benefit exchanges. We analyzed the relationship 
between exchange enrollment and premiums, simulating 
the ACA with the mandate, and several alternative scenarios 
without it, representing different levels of exchange 
enrollment. Without a mandate, nongroup premiums overall 
would increase by roughly 10 percent with high exchange 
participation and by 25 percent with low participation. 
With low participation, those enrolled in the exchange 
would be at a significantly higher risk of high health care 
costs than those outside the exchange. In particular, a 
majority of those covered in the exchange would be aged 
45 or older. There would be risk adjustment between 
plans inside and outside the exchange, but risk adjustment 
methods may not be effective enough to completely 
eliminate risk selecting behavior by insurers. We have 
modeled risk adjustment as if it would do so; if actual risk 
adjustment were less effective, it would increase exchange 
premiums beyond these estimates and expose plans in the 
exchange to greater risk. Given the uncertainty in initial 
exchange enrollment, the possibility of adverse selection 
and potentially greater exposure to risk may make insurers 
reluctant to offer coverage through the exchange without an 
individual mandate. 
Introduction
The federal legal requirement for most 
Americans to be covered by a health 
insurance plan that meets certain minimal 
standards or pay a penalty continues to 
be the most controversial aspect of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA). One year ago, we released 
an analysis comparing the effects of the 
ACA with and without this individual 
mandate.1 In this paper, we update 
those findings to incorporate more 
recent survey data and a revised model 
reflecting the latest available federal draft 
regulations and current trends in state 
implementation decisions. In addition, we 
present new sensitivity analyses related to 
different levels of exchange enrollment.
The effects of eliminating the mandate, 
particularly for nongroup premiums, are 
very sensitive to the number and costs  
of people enrolling in subsidized 
coverage in the exchanges. Insurers  
fear substantial adverse selection in  
the nongroup market in the absence  
of an individual mandate when reforms 
such as guaranteed issue, prohibitions 
on pre-existing condition exclusions, 
and modified community rating are in 
place, as the ACA requires. The current 
nongroup market in New York, which is 
guaranteed issue and pure community 
rated, but does not have an individual 
mandate is cited as a doomsday example 
of what could happen. This market 
has an enrollment of less than 40,000 
and premiums around $1,200 a month. 
However, New York does not have the 
provision under the ACA that provides 
subsidized coverage in the exchanges.2 
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We showed in the previous paper that 
robust enrollment in subsidized coverage 
could significantly mitigate adverse 
selection and stabilize the market at 
reasonable premium levels. However, 
the enrollment in the exchange will be 
heavily dependent on the effectiveness 
of implementation and outreach, 
particularly in the early years. Many new 
systems must be in place and operational 
by 2014 to smoothly determine eligibility 
and enroll the eligible. Outreach is 
crucial to early enrollment levels.3 
Investments in outreach are expected 
to vary across the states. There is a 
legitimate concern that initial exchange 
enrollment may not be large enough 
to counter adverse selection absent a 
requirement to obtain coverage.
To examine this concern, we conducted 
a sensitivity analysis, simulating 
four alternative scenarios: First, we 
simulated the ACA as enacted, including 
the individual mandate. Second, we 
simulated the ACA without the mandate 
and with enrollment consistent with 
a successful exchange and effective 
outreach to those who would be eligible 
for subsidized coverage. We will call 
this robust exchange participation. 
Third, we simulated the ACA without 
the mandate, using a lower preference 
for the nongroup and small group 
exchanges. This sensitivity demonstrates 
potentially lower exchange enrollment 
due to factors that are difficult to model 
directly, such as low carrier participation, 
insurance agent steering of consumers 
to non-exchange coverage, inadequate 
publicity, or Web interface difficulties. 
Such barriers to enrollment would 
affect all seeking coverage in either 
the nongroup or small group markets, 
regardless of eligibility for subsidies. 
Those discouraged from enrolling 
in the exchange would either enroll 
in coverage outside the exchange or 
choose to go without insurance. Fourth, 
we simulated the ACA without the 
mandate, using a lower preference for 
the exchange combined with lower 
take-up of subsidized coverage. Lower 
take-up of subsidized coverage could 
result from inadequate outreach to 
those eligible, difficulties with the 
eligibility and enrollment interface, or 
a discouraging effect of the end-of-year 
tax reconciliation process. We separate 
the last two scenarios because their 
potential causes are distinct, their effects 
on premiums differ, and either could 
occur during exchange implementation 
in a particular state.
Methods
To estimate the effects of health reform 
and the individual mandate, we use the 
Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM).4 HIPSM 
simulates the decisions of businesses 
and individuals in response to policy 
changes, such as Medicaid expansions, 
new health insurance options, subsidies 
for the purchase of health insurance, 
and insurance market reforms. The 
model provides estimates of changes 
in government and private spending, 
premiums, rates of employer offers of 
coverage, and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specific reforms.5 
We simulate the main coverage 
provisions of the ACA is if they were 
fully implemented in 2011, and compare 
results to the HIPSM baseline results for 
2011 without implementation of these 
reforms. This approach differs from that 
of the Congressional Budget Office or 
the CMS actuaries who by necessity 
provide 10-year estimates. Our approach 
permits more direct comparisons of 
reform with the pre-reform baseline 
and of various individual mandate 
scenarios with each other. The key 
coverage provisions of the ACA and their 
implications for coverage and costs were 
summarized in an earlier policy brief.6 
To model the individual mandate, we 
begin with the baseline HIPSM model, 
in which behavior is calibrated to agree 
with results from the empirical health 
economics literature.7 The resulting 
model behavior is applicable for a 
voluntary health insurance regime, so 
we must also simulate how behavior 
would change in the presence of a 
mandate. Since a similar law only exists in 
Massachusetts after its health reforms, the 
only available empirical data are from that 
state.8 Our simulation of how behavior 
would change under the mandate has 
three components. First, we compute 
the financial penalty the family (tax 
unit) would face, as defined in the law. 
Second, the mandate is more than a dollar 
amount; it is a legal requirement. Desire 
to comply with the law, aversion to an 
income tax penalty, and the new social 
norm to have health coverage can lead to 
behavioral responses much stronger than 
the nominal amount of the penalty would 
suggest. We operationalize this by making 
being uninsured less attractive to families 
affected by the mandate. 
Results were benchmarked by 
comparing the results of a simulation 
based on Massachusetts law with 
the results of health reform in 
Massachusetts.9 Third, the introduction 
of the mandate in Massachusetts 
affected the behavior of many not 
subject to penalties. Some may have 
been uncertain whether or not they 
would face penalties at the end of 
the year due to changes in income or 
other circumstances. Others may have 
responded to outreach that represented 
having coverage as a new social norm. 
Since these will also be factors under 
the ACA, we make being uninsured 
slightly less attractive to families who 
would not face mandate penalties when 
the mandate is in effect. Again, we used 
Massachusetts data to calibrate this effect.
When we reduced the preferences for 
the nongroup exchange and the take-
up of subsidized coverage, we did so 
by adjusting the expected utility of the 
affected options by a flat amount for all 
families in the relevant group. The effects 
we intended to capture—enrollment 
interface problems, ineffective outreach, 
etc.—would affect all families roughly 
equally as barriers to enrollment. Those 
discouraged from enrolling would either 
take up private coverage outside the 
exchange or choose to remain uninsured. 
In particular, most of those eligible 
for subsidies would find unsubsidized 
private coverage unaffordable. 
This adjustment to take-up behavior 
preserves the relative preferences of 
families for the exchange and subsidized 
coverage; those who have the strongest 
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Table 1. Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of the Nonelderly in Baseline and Reform
 Without Reform ACA With Mandate
ACA Without Mandate,  
Robust Exchange 
Enrollment
ACA Without Mandate, 
 Low Exchange Preference
ACA Without Mandate,  
Low Exchange Preference, 
Low Subsidy Take-Up
N % N % N % N % N %
Coverage (in millions)
Private 164.9 61.4% 172.3 64.1% 161.3 60.0% 161.6 60.1% 160.0 59.5%
Employer (non-exchange) 150.4 56.0% 144.6 53.8% 139.5 51.9% 144.4 53.7% 145.2 54.0%
Nongroup (non-exchange) 14.5 5.4% 2.5 0.9% 1.9 0.7% 5.6 2.1% 5.2 1.9%
Exchange employer --- --- 9.9 3.7% 8.8 3.3% 4.2 1.6% 4.4 1.6%
Exchange nongroup --- --- 15.3 5.7% 11.1 4.1% 7.4 2.8% 5.2 1.9%
Subsidized Consumer --- --- 8.5 3.1% 6.2 2.3% 5.5 2.1% 3.6 1.3%
Unsubsidized Consumer --- --- 6.8 2.5% 4.9 1.8% 1.9 0.7% 1.6 0.6%
Medicaid/CHIP 45.1 16.8% 61.5 22.9% 59.0 22.0% 58.6 21.8% 58.0 21.6%
Other (including Medicare) 8.5 3.2% 8.5 3.2% 8.5 3.2% 8.5 3.2% 8.5 3.2%
Uninsured 50.3 18.7% 26.4 9.8% 39.8 14.8% 40.0 14.9% 42.2 15.7%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2011.
preferences, (i.e., have the most to gain 
from subsidies and exchange coverage,) 
are still the most likely to enroll. In 
particular, those eligible for subsidies and 
currently uninsured who have higher 
health care needs would be more likely 
to enroll than those who believe they 
will incur low health care costs. This 
is the basic driver of adverse selection 
without the mandate. For the scenario 
with low exchange preference, we 
shifted the preference until the overall 
nongroup exchange was about half as 
large as under the ACA with the mandate. 
For the scenario with low subsidy 
take-up and low exchange preference, 
we reduced the number enrolled in 
subsidized coverage to half the enrollment 
under the ACA with the mandate.
The results here differ from HIPSM 
estimates published in early 2011 for 
several reasons. First, since that time, 
we have developed detailed state-
specific versions of the model for 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and 
Virginia. The experience of adapting the 
model to a diverse set of states and new 
collaborations with experts in several 
fields has led to improvements in the 
model, notably in the modeling of the 
affordability exemption to the mandate, 
the affordable ESI offer test for subsidy 
eligibility, the choice of exchange versus 
non-exchange plans for families and 
small businesses, and Medicaid/CHIP 
eligibility testing and enrollment for 
those seeking coverage in the exchange. 
Second, we assumed that the nongroup 
and small group markets would not 
be pooled together when computing 
premiums. Previous papers using 
HIPSM modeled the two markets being 
pooled together. A few states, such as 
Massachusetts, have already pooled these 
markets and a few more are considering 
doing so, but the large majority of states 
are expected to leave them separate, at 
least in the near term.10 
Third, for this analysis, we simulated the 
affordability exemption to the individual 
mandate that observers expect to be 
in the forthcoming regulations; this 
is different from the interpretation of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation and 
Congressional Budget Office that we 
used in earlier modeling. We assume 
that dependents will not incur mandate 
penalties if they do not obtain coverage 
and the lowest available family premium 
is above 8 percent of family income. 
A family would still be barred from 
subsidized exchange coverage if the 
lowest single premium offered to one 
member was less than 9.5 percent of 
family income.
As a result of these changes, the number 
of remaining uninsured is about 4 
million higher than in previous estimates. 
About half of this difference is due the 
first update described above, and the 
remainder is due to the second and third. 
Care must be taken when comparing 
these numbers with CBO estimates of 
numbers of the uninsured, since ours are 
for full implementation in 2011, whereas 
CBO phases in implementation over the 
period 2014 to 2017.11
Results
Coverage
We first consider how the distribution of 
health insurance coverage would change 
under health reform (Table 1). Relative 
to current levels, full implementation 
of the ACA with a mandate would 
increase private insurance by 7.4 million 
nonelderly enrollees, from 164.9 million 
without reform to 172.3 million. The 
nongroup exchange would cover 15.3 
million nonelderly residents, or 5.7 
percent of the nonelderly population. 
Within the nongroup exchange, 
approximately 55 percent, or 8.5 million 
enrollees, would receive subsidies. In 
addition to increased coverage through 
private insurance, nonelderly Medicaid 
enrollment would increase by 16.4 
million. In total, full implementation of 
the ACA would decrease the nonelderly 
uninsured population by 23.9 million, 
from 50.3 million to 26.4 million.
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Table 2.  New Health Care Spending of the Government, Employers, Individuals, and Uncompensated  
Care - Acute Care, Nonelderly (in billions)
 
Without Reform
ACA With 
Mandate
ACA Without Mandate,  
Robust Exchange Enrollment
ACA Without Mandate,  
Low Exchange Preference
ACA Without Mandate,  
Low Exchange Preference,  
Low Subsidy Take-Up
$ $ $ Δ Mandate $ Δ Mandate $ Δ Mandate
Government $253 $340 $330 -$10 $327 -$14 $315 -$26
Employer $529 $540 $507 -$34 $511 -$30 $515 -$26
Individual $360 $371 $342 -$29 $346 -$25 $342 -$30
Uncompensated Care $78 $39 $59 $20 $59 $21 $61 $23
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2011. 
We then estimated the effects of 
removing the mandate from an 
otherwise complete implementation of 
the ACA, but assuming robust exchange 
enrollment. The nongroup exchange 
would be noticeably smaller without 
the mandate, decreasing by 4.2 million 
enrollees to 11.1 million. Despite this 
decrease, the proportion of subsidized 
enrollees in the nongroup exchange 
remains relatively constant at 56 percent 
for a total of 6.2 million subsidized 
consumers. Relative to current levels, 
enacting the ACA without a mandate 
would decrease overall private insurance 
coverage from 164.9 million to 161.3 
million, a difference of 3.6 million. 
This difference is due largely to the 
expansion of Medicaid eligibility without 
the simultaneous increase in private 
coverage take-up that the mandate will 
bring. The ACA with a mandate would 
increase private coverage by 7.4 million 
since the mandate will significantly 
increase demand for private insurance. 
Removing the mandate would also 
have a modest effect on the Medicaid 
expansion; 59.0 million nonelderly 
residents would enroll in Medicaid/
CHIP programs without the mandate, 
2.5 million fewer than with the mandate. 
Some of those eligible for Medicaid and 
CHIP would be subject to the mandate. 
For example, CHIP eligibility includes 
children in families with incomes up 
to 400 percent of the poverty level 
in some states. Without the mandate, 
parents would be much less likely to 
seek coverage for their children and 
themselves. Also, as noted in the methods 
section above, the presence of a mandate 
has a small effect even on those who do 
not end up subject to penalties. There 
would be somewhat lower enrollment 
among this group as well. Overall, 10.5 
million fewer nonelderly people would 
be uninsured than without health 
reform; however, this is less than half the 
decrease with the mandate. Nearly 40 
million would remain uninsured. 
Next, we estimated two scenarios in 
which implementation difficulties 
reduce the impact of the ACA without 
a mandate. In the first scenario, 
factors such as inadequate publicity 
and low carrier participation cause a 
lowered preference for the exchange. 
Enrollment in the nongroup exchange 
would decrease to 7.4 million people. 
This reduction would be offset by 
a 3.7 million enrollee increase in 
the nongroup market outside of the 
exchange. Almost 75 percent of those 
covered in the nongroup exchange 
would receive subsidized coverage. This 
increased proportion is not surprising 
given that those eligible for subsidies 
have the most to gain in the exchange, 
and thus are least likely to be deterred 
by implementation difficulties. The 
low exchange preference would also 
affect the employer exchange, reducing 
the number of enrollees from 8.8 
million without a mandate but robust 
exchange participation to 4.2 million 
without a mandate and lower exchange 
participation. Again, this would be offset 
by an increase in the employer market 
outside the exchange. 
A low preference for the exchange would 
also have a modest effect on Medicaid, 
with nonelderly enrollment decreasing 
by 400,000. Overall, a low exchange 
preference has only a small effect on 
overall insurance coverage; only 200,000 
more would be uninsured compared with 
robust exchange enrollment under the 
ACA without the mandate.
The second scenario with lower 
exchange participation combines 
low subsidy take-up with the lower 
preference for exchange coverage. 
Nongroup enrollment outside the 
exchange would fall to 5.2 million 
nonelderly enrollees. Overall, the 
nongroup exchange would account for 
1.9 percent of the nonelderly population, 
less than half the size of the exchange 
with implementation of the ACA without 
a mandate but with robust exchange 
participation. The number of subsidized 
enrollees in the nongroup exchange 
would decrease to 3.6 million, or 69 
percent of the total nongroup exchange. 
Again, the decreased use of the exchange 
and reduced spillover effect would 
cause a further reduction in nonelderly 
Medicaid enrollment of 0.6 million 
people. The lower exchange preference 
combined with lower take-up would 
result in a 15.7 percent uninsured rate, 
or 42.2 million nonelderly residents. 
This figure represents an increase 
of 2.4 million uninsured nonelderly 
people compared to a robust exchange 
participation level of the ACA without 
a mandate and almost 16 million more 
uninsured than with a mandate.
Spending – All Sources
In Table 2, we estimate the total amount 
of health care spending on acute care 
for the nonelderly. Full implementation 
of the ACA with a mandate would 
increase government spending from 
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Table 3. Health Care Spending of the Government 
Without Reform
ACA With 
Mandate
ACA Without Mandate,  
Robust Exchange Enrollment
ACA Without Mandate,  
Low Exchange Preference
ACA Without Mandate,  
Low Exchange Preference,  
Low Subsidy Take-Up
$ $ $ Δ Mandate $ Δ Mandate $ Δ Mandate
Government Spending (in millions)
Medicaid/CHIPa $252,560 $306,000 $300,510 -$5,490 $299,340 -$6,660 $298,060 -$7,940
Premium subsidies $0 $32,767 $27,886 -$4,880 $27,370 -$5,397 $17,170 -$15,596
Cost-sharing subsidies $0 $4,703 $3,836 -$867 $3,192 -$1,511 $2,430 -$2,273
Employer subsidies $0 $3,794 $3,515 -$278 $2,629 -$1,164 $2,734 -$1,060
Individual Mandates $0 -$3,414 $0 $3,414 $0 $3,414 $0 $3,414
Employer Penalties $0 -$3,457 -$5,675 -$2,218 -$5,675 -$2,218 -$5,677 -$2,220
Net government spending $252,560 $340,391 $330,073 -$10,319 $326,856 -$13,536 $314,717 -$25,675
    Avg. Subsidy Amount $0 $4,426 $5,145 $719 $5,510 $1,084 $5,414 $988
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2011.   a Spending on acute care for the non-elderly.
$253 billion without reform to $340 
billion. Aggregate employer and 
individual spending would each 
increase by $11 billion to $540 
billion and $371 billion, respectively. 
Uncompensated care, paid for by 
federal, state, and local governments 
as well as health care providers, would 
decrease by 50 percent from $78 billion 
to $39 billion.12 
Without the mandate, we would see 
aggregate decreases in government, 
employer, and individual spending due 
to lower health insurance coverage. 
However, costs do not decrease 
proportionally with declines in coverage. 
With the mandate, we would see a 
decrease in uninsurance of 48 percent 
(Table 1) relative to current levels, 
with an increase in government costs 
of 34 percent. Without the mandate, 
uninsurance would decrease by 21 
percent relative to no reform with an 
increase in government spending of 30 
percent. The government would spend 
about 3 percent less for less than half 
the increase in coverage. Additionally, 
removing the mandate would mean $20 
billion more in uncompensated care 
provided to the uninsured.
We would continue to see decreases 
in aggregate government, employer, 
and individual spending as exchange 
participation falls. Government spending 
would decrease to $327 billion with a 
lower exchange preference and $315 
billion, or 8 percent, when also lowering 
subsidy take-up. Uncompensated care 
would remain relatively constant across 
the exchange participation levels, changing 
by roughly the same percentages as the 
uninsured (Table 1).
The mandate, or lack thereof, may affect 
the federal government’s ability to 
achieve uncompensated care savings. 
Fewer uninsured means less spending 
on uncompensated care, but this 
does not automatically translate into 
government savings. About 35 percent 
of uncompensated care is paid for by 
the federal government.13 The two 
largest sources of federal funding for 
uncompensated care are Medicaid and 
Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital 
(DSH) payments. Under the ACA, federal 
Medicaid DSH payments will not decrease 
until a state’s uninsurance rate decreases 
by 45 percent, which is unlikely to 
happen without an individual mandate 
(Table 1), compromising this potential 
cost offset for the federal government. 
Spending – Government 
In Table 3, we take a more detailed look 
at government spending on acute care 
for the nonelderly. Full implementation of 
the ACA with a mandate would result in 
$306 billion in Medicaid/CHIP spending 
on acute care for the nonelderly, an 
increase of approximately $50 billion 
relative to expenditures absent reform. 
The government would spend a little 
under $37.5 billion on premium and 
cost sharing subsidies in the exchange. 
Employer subsidies would total $3.8 
billion, although those costs would be 
largely offset by government revenue 
from employer penalties. There would 
be modest government revenue of $3.4 
billion from individual mandate penalties.
Removing the mandate from the ACA 
would result in lower costs across the 
board, because fewer people would 
have health insurance. Lower take-up of 
Medicaid and CHIP without a mandate 
would reduce spending by approximately 
$6 billion. Without a mandate but 
with robust exchange participation, 
government spending on premium and 
cost-sharing subsidies in the exchange 
would be about $6 billion less than 
under the ACA with a mandate. There 
would be about 2 million fewer people 
enrolled in subsidized coverage (Table 
1). However, the amount of subsidies 
paid per enrollee would be more than 
$700 higher (Table 3) as a result of 
higher premiums in the exchange. We 
will examine changes in premiums 
below. There would also be an increase 
in employer penalties, while employer 
subsidies would decrease slightly.
Government spending would decrease 
slightly with lower exchange enrollment. 
Compared to the ACA without a mandate 
with robust exchange enrollment, 
both Medicaid and premium subsidy 
expenditures would remain relatively 
constant with a lower exchange 
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Table 4.  Average Premium Per Covered Life, Average Age, and Tobacco Use Rate Among Adults in the 
Nongroup Marketa
ACA With Mandate
ACA Without Mandate,  
Robust Exchange Enrollment
ACA Without Mandate, Low Exchange 
Preference
ACA Without Mandate,  
Low Exchange Preference,  
Low Subsidy Take-Up
 $ $ Δ Mandate $ Δ Mandate $ Δ Mandate
Avg. Premium Per Covered Life
Total Nongroup $5,100 $5,600 10% $5,700 12% $6,100 20%
Non-Exchange $4,900 $5,100 4% $5,400 10% $5,600 14%
Exchange $5,200 $5,700 10% $5,900 13% $6,500 25%
Percent Aged 45 and Older
Total Nongroup 37.1% 42.5% --- 42.0% --- 42.8% ---
Non-Exchange 25.5% 28.2% --- 32.3% --- 30.3% ---
Exchange 39.0% 44.9% --- 49.4% --- 55.4% ---
Tobacco Use Rate Among Adults
Total Nongroup 13.4% 12.4% --- 12.2% --- 11.7% ---
Non-Exchange 9.8% 8.2% --- 9.6% --- 9.4% ---
Exchange 14.0% 13.0% --- 14.0% --- 13.7% ---
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2011.   a Averaged over all benefit levels in the exchanges.
preference, decreasing by $1.2 billion 
and $0.5 billion respectively. Enrollment 
in Medicaid and subsidized coverage is 
only modestly lower (Table 1), so the 
differences in cost are small. 
Government spending would fall further 
if subsidy take-up was also lower than 
in the robust participation scenario. 
Government spending on premium and 
cost-sharing subsidies would total only 
$19.6 billion, a little over 50 percent of 
the same expenditure category under 
full implementation of the ACA with 
a mandate. The subsidized population 
would be 60 percent lower than with 
a mandate (Table 1), while the average 
subsidy dollars per enrollee would be 
about $1,000 higher than with a mandate. 
Premiums
In Table 4, we show estimated 
premiums in the nongroup market 
under the four scenarios. With a 
mandate, average premiums in the total 
nongroup market would be $5,100; 
premiums would be slightly higher in 
the exchange, $5,200 on average, than 
outside it ($4,900 on average). Without 
a mandate, but with robust exchange 
participation, overall nongroup 
premiums rise about 10 percent due to 
adverse selection. We observe a similar 
increase in the nongroup exchange 
premiums, which would rise to $5,700. 
The effects of adverse selection in 
the exchange are mitigated by the 
large subsidized population (Table 1). 
Removing the mandate has a much 
smaller effect on premiums in the 
nongroup market outside the exchange, 
where premiums would only rise by 
about 4 percent. 
A natural question is how nongroup 
premiums inside and outside the 
exchange can change at different rates 
when there is risk adjustment between 
them. Nongroup premiums are rated 
by age and tobacco use.14 Different 
distributions of enrollees who vary 
on these characteristics can lead to 
very different average premiums. The 
premium charged to a 64-year-old may 
be up to three times that charged to the 
youngest adult, and premiums charged to 
tobacco users can be up to 1.5 times the 
premiums charged to a non-tobacco user 
of the same age.15 Subsidies are higher 
for older adults, since the premium 
charged to a subsidy-eligible enrollee in 
the exchange is capped at a percent of 
family income. Not so with tobacco use 
rating; the additional premium cost for 
tobacco users is not subsidized by the 
government, leading to a substantial out-
of-pocket cost for the affected families 
(low-income or not). 
Under all reform scenarios, nongroup 
exchange enrollees are older and use 
tobacco at a higher rate than those 
covered by nongroup policies outside 
the exchange (Table 4). Those covered 
outside the exchange in the nongroup 
market consist mostly of those who 
were in the nongroup market before 
guaranteed issue, modified community 
rating, and other market reforms were 
implemented.16 These would be healthier 
than the population in general because 
they passed the former restrictions on 
access to coverage. Most of those in the 
exchange would be eligible for subsidies, 
and low income is associated with 
higher tobacco use. 
Without the mandate, the share of 
covered lives aged 45 and older rises 
from 26 to 28 percent outside the 
exchange, and from 39 to 45 percent 
in the exchange. The greater rise in 
in the share of enrollees over age 45 
inside the exchange is the reason why 
the average exchange premium rises 
10 percent in the exchange, but only 
5 percent outside it. In Table 5, we 
show how health care costs vary by 
age, listing average single nongroup 
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premiums for non-tobacco users by age 
group. The difference between the 18 
to 24 and 35 to 44 categories is about 
$1,100, while the premium for ages 
55 to 64 is more than twice that for 
35- to 44-year-olds. Thus, even moderate 
changes in the share of enrollees 
45 and older can lead to substantial 
changes in the average premium.
The share of tobacco users with 
nongroup coverage would be lower 
without a mandate than with one, as 
more tobacco users are discouraged 
from obtaining insurance coverage once 
the requirement is removed because 
of the additional premium cost (data 
not shown). Since the full premium for 
tobacco users would be up to 50 percent 
higher than for a non-tobacco user of the 
same age, small differences in the share 
of tobacco users can change the average 
premium noticeably.
Adverse selection would increase as 
exchange participation falls. Premiums 
in the nongroup exchange would 
rise by 13.5 percent with a low 
exchange preference relative to a 
full implementation of the ACA with 
a mandate; nongroup non-exchange 
average premiums would rise by just 
over 10 percent. The growth rates inside 
and outside the exchange are much 
closer because this scenario moves a 
number of higher-cost people previously 
enrolled in the exchange to non-
exchange policies. 
When we simulate low subsidy take-
up, average nongroup premiums would 
rise 20 percent. Nongroup exchange 
premiums would rise by 25 percent. Not 
only does this mean higher premiums 
for those not eligible for subsidies, but 
the federal government would have to 
pay more premium subsidies for each 
subsidized enrollee. This increase would 
be high enough that some plans might 
be discouraged from participating in the 
exchange, particularly when, in addition, 
55 percent of those covered in the 
exchange would be aged 45 or older. The 
differential between growth rates inside 
versus outside the exchange increase 
without a large subsidized population 
to mitigate adverse selection in the 
exchange. Nongroup premiums outside 
the exchange would also rise, but at the 
lower rate of 14 percent. 
Discussion
With an individual mandate, our model 
predicts that the number of uninsured 
would fall from 50 million to 26 million 
under health reform. Without the 
mandate, 40 to 42 million would be left 
uninsured under reform. Even though 
the gain in coverage under reform is 
cut by more than half, the government 
would only spend 3 to 8 percent 
less on acute care for the nonelderly. 
Reductions in uncompensated care, 
paid on behalf of the uninsured by 
taxpayers and health care providers, 
would also be much smaller without a 
mandate. Also, the reduction in Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) 
payments in the ACA is conditional on a 
45 percent reduction in the uninsured. 
Without a mandate, this condition may 
not be met, in which case there would 
be no Medicaid DSH savings to the 
federal government.
The Medicaid expansion clearly does not 
need the individual mandate to increase 
coverage; experience with previous 
expansions and the CHIP program has 
demonstrated that. Also, the lack of 
an individual mandate is unlikely to 
undermine coverage in the small group 
market. An exchange for small businesses 
currently operates in Utah without a 
mandate, and there is a history of such 
entities operating over time.17 The small 
group market is already guaranteed 
issue by federal law, and is subject to 
rate bands in many states. In New York, 
for example, the small group market 
is community-rated like the nongroup 
market, but the small group market 
has not seen the substantial decline in 
enrollment that the nongroup market 
has. In fact, 50.6 percent of New York 
small businesses offer coverage, much 
higher than the national average of 39.2 
percent.18 The effects of not having 
an individual mandate or an effective 
equivalent will be most pronounced in 
the nongroup market. 
Given the debate over the legality 
of the individual mandate, several 
alternatives have been discussed. The 
Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) released a thorough report on 
various mandate alternatives including, 
but not limited to, the following19: 
Insurers commonly limit enrollment 
to certain specified periods in order 
to help reduce adverse selection. 
Increasing the time interval between 
open enrollment periods, currently 
one year20, has been proposed as a 
potential substitute for the individual 
mandate. In the same vein, take-up 
could be incentivized by providing only 
limited or penalized coverage options 
between open enrollment periods. 
Alternatively, the individual mandate 
could be removed in favor of a tax on 
all taxpayers that is waived with proof 
of health insurance. In another proposal, 
the mandate could be removed, and 
instead, the government could make 
certain services conditional on having 
health insurance, such as a college loan, 
or receiving certain tax breaks.21 These 
options each have their advantages 
and disadvantages, but there is little 
evidence on which to model their 
effectiveness.
Making subsidies more generous would 
increase take-up, but the barriers to 
exchange enrollment and limitations 
of outreach simulated in our last two 
scenarios would still be problematic 
regardless of subsidy amounts. Also, 
increasing subsidy amounts would not 
necessarily reduce adverse selection. It 
could attract those with higher health 
costs, depending on how the subsidies 
were restructured.22 
Barring any effective equivalent for the 
mandate, the nongroup market would 
avoid substantial adverse selection under 
Table 5.  Average Single Nongroup 
Premium by Age Category
 ACA With Mandate
18-24 $3,000
25-34 $3,900 
35-44 $4,100
45-54 $6,200
55-64 $8,700
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2011.
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the ACA market reforms only with a 
large number of modest-income persons 
enrolled in subsidized coverage. There is 
a genuine risk that low initial exchange 
enrollment could start an adverse selection 
cycle. Under our low subsidy take-up 
scenario, exchange premiums would rise 
25 percent compared to the scenario 
with a mandate in place. The population 
enrolled in the exchange would have 
higher health risk than the population 
in the nongroup market outside the 
exchange in this scenario. In particular, a 
majority of those enrolled in the nongroup 
exchange would be age 45 or older. 
There would be risk adjustment between 
plans inside and outside the exchange, 
but risk adjustment methods may not be 
effective enough to completely eliminate 
risk selecting behavior by insurers. We 
have modeled risk adjustment as if it 
would do so; if actual risk adjustment 
were less effective, it would increase 
exchange premiums beyond these 
estimates and expose plans in the 
exchange to greater risk. Such differential 
risk would be likely to discourage some 
plans from participating in the exchange. 
Those individuals currently in the 
nongroup market would be particularly 
likely to stay outside the exchange. Also, 
if low exchange enrollment continues 
after 2019, there will be an additional 
problem in that subsidy amounts would 
be indexed based on the rate of income 
growth. Historically, premiums have 
grown faster than income. Thus, those 
in subsidized coverage would pay 
an increasing share of their incomes 
in premiums, further discouraging 
enrollment. As such, the nongroup 
exchange may not be viable in some 
states without an individual mandate. 
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